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Abstract 
 
One of the problems which sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are confronted with is the low level of investment. 
Yet, the theory of capital tells us that it is impossible to envisage development without a considerable accumulation of 
capital. An important channel through which those countries can solve this capital issue is to resort to foreign direct 
investment (FDI), especially knowing the considerable role such investment played in the development of the economy 
of several Asian countries. Sub-Saharan African countries have not benefited enough from such a type of investment 
form many reasons. One of them is the quality of institutions. This paper investigates the linkages between political risk, 
institutional quality and FDI using different econometric techniques for a data sample of 30 African Sub-Saharan 
countries from period 1984 to 2007. This paper argues that countries whose governments are highly ranked according to 
various indices of the quality of institutions tend to do better in attracting FDI. In an empirical analysis of cross-section 
data, the paper finds that different aspects of the quality of institutions of a country (corruption, law and order, 
government stability, profile of investment, internal and external conflicts etc...) are almost always significant, 
regardless of the other control variables that are used in the least-squares and instrumental variables estimation. By 
using the interaction approaches, we find that when a host country's institutions qualities are sufficiently low, a further 
decrease in institutions may not stimulate and, in fact, may even decrease FDI inflows. In addition, FDI inflows 
significantly rise as the institutions quality become better. We also find that the marginal effect of natural resources on 
FDI depends on the level of resources abundance; i.e., when a country is resource-intensive, the marginal effect of 
natural resource on FDI inflows increases. In the non resource-intensive countries, natural resources might be more 
effective to attract FDI. Our results suggest that the institutional quality competition between FDI host countries may 
have different impacts on countries with different natural resource levels. Thus, the ability of a country to benefit from 
financial globalization and its vulnerability to financial crises can be significantly affected by the quality of its domestic 
institutions and its macroeconomic framework.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------- 
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1-Introduction and Motivation 
 
During the previous decade, the literature dedicated to the theory of the economic development has been renewed by 
focusing on the quality of domestic institutions as key determinant of cross-country differences in both growth rate and 
income per capita. Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and low level of corruption have shown to be highly correlated with growth Edison et 
al. (2003). Also, there has been an increasing interest in the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
developing countries. Several empirical studies revealed the role played by FDI as major constituents of capital flows in 
these countries. Moreover, capital flows relax the constraints on the mobilization of resources of a country, generate the 
exchange of technological and organizational knowledge, and can cause institutional change. Hence, capital flows 
represent additional resources a country needs to improve its economic performance and provide both physical capital 
and employment possibilities that may not be needed in the host market. Not surprisingly, thus, a number of authors 
have also studied the link between institutional quality and FDI (see Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Kostevc et al., 2007 
etc...). FDI is now a large share of capital formation in poor countries, the FDI-promoting effect of good institutions 
might be an important channel of their overall effect on growth and development. Poorly regulated institutions and/or a 
complete lack of institutional governance causes additional costs to the wellness to invest in SSA countries (Wei, 2000). 
The high sunk costs associated with investing offshore, along with the uncertainty associated with poor physical and 
financial infrastructure along with weak enforcement of regulations and ineffective legal systems, has progressively 
forced companies to be increasingly selective as to where to invest. Like Vittorio and Ugo (2006), it is clear that 
institutions may affect FDI inflows through three potential channels. First, the presence of good institutions tends to 
improve factor productivity and subsequently stimulates investments, whether domestic or external. Second, good 
institutions will result in a reduction in investment related transaction costs (i.e. corruption-related costs). Finally, as by 
definition, FDI generally involve high sunk costs. Therefore, good institutions (i.e. proper property right enforcement, 
effective legal systems) will give more security to multinational firms. 
To attract and increase investments of productive capital, countries must continue to endeavour and create a transparent, 
stable foreseeable framework, equipped with mechanisms for execution of adequate contracts and respect of the 
property rights, articulate good macroeconomic policies and of institutions which make it possible for the national 
companies as well as international to carry on their activities in an effective and profitable way and to have a maximum 
impact on development
2
. Thus, it is essential to improve these principal aspects in order to influence the choices of 
establishment of the investment. That requires identifying factors which can differ from an area to another, taking into 
account specificities and the potentialities relative to each one of it. This study asks the following questions: what are 
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the determinants of FDI flows? Generally, these factors could be separated into two categories: (i) economic factors 
and, (ii) factors that have to do with regulatory, bureaucratic, political and judicial environment. 
In fact, the institutional quality of a host country has received growing attention in the recent literature as one of the key 
determinants in location decisions made by foreign firms. Institutions provide the incentive structure for exchange that 
determines the cost of transaction and the cost of transformation in an economy (North, 1990). Institutional variables 
such as the legal and political systems are thought to be crucial in affecting economic performance through their effect 
on investment decisions by curbing the risk of opportunism. This may be a particularly important issue for foreign 
investors who are not familiar with `the rules of the game in a society' (Alfaro et al., 2005). Less corruption and a fair, 
predictable, efficient bureaucracy may help attract FDI (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). 
 The majority of papers on this topic provide evidence in support of a positive effect of the role of institutions in entry 
decisions by multinational enterprises (MNE). Campos and Kinoshita (2003) show that quality of institutions is one of 
the main determinants of FDI inflows to transition countries. Based on the analysis of panel data in developing 
countries, Gastanaga et al. (1998) demonstrate the direct effect of institutional characteristics on FDI. 
Several studies exist on the determinants of FDI in Sub Saharan African (SSA)
3
. A common perception of all these 
studies is that FDI to Africa is driven by availability of natural resources, mainly solid minerals and crude oil. This has 
severe policy implications. If this is true, then FDI in the region is largely determined by an uncontrollable factor. In 
addition, it suggests that countries that do not have natural resources will attract very little or no FDI regardless of the 
policies they adopt (Asiedu, 2005). Most of these studies on FDI in Africa argued that good institutions may have a 
positive impact on FDI outflows because they create favourable conditions for multinational companies to emerge and 
invest abroad. However, none of these studies has attempted to examine how the importance of these institutions varies 
depending on the characteristics of countries in the sample (oil exporters, non-oil exporters or countries rich or not in 
natural resources).   
For these reasons, this paper considers in particular the effects of the second category of factors, namely, the effects of 
the quality of the country institutional environment on the inflows of FDI in the economy. Specifically, the present 
paper attempts to investigate the institutional quality impact on FDI by asking the following questions: Do institutions 
quality (corruption, bureaucratic delays, rule and law, investment profile index, political stability, government 
effectiveness, internal and external conflicts) affect FDI inflows? If institutions do matter, what is the nature of the 
relationship between FDI movements and institutions quality? Are there systematic differences across countries with 
different institutions quality levels? In other words, how do countries characteristics influence the relationship between 
government policies, institutions, and FDI inflows? Does the marginal effect of natural resources on FDI depend on the 
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host country's institutions quality? In other words, does the effect of natural resources on FDI depend on the host 
country's institutions quality? 
To address these questions, we apply panel data analysis technique namely fixed effects models and random effects 
specification. This approach allows us to distinguish more systematically between the effects of policy changes and 
other variable elements of the investment climate on FDI over time as well as across countries.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss briefly the literature review. Section 3 
introduces the data description and the model specification employed in our empirical application. In Section 4 the 
empirical results are presented. The concluding section, section 5, summarizes our contribution to the literature and 
discusses future research avenues. 
2-Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
Several theories attempted to explain why firms engage in transnational production, which is an effect of FDI. Faeth 
(2008) presents nine theoretical models of FDI. However, there is no clear-cut theory of determinant of FDI flows, 
especially in developing countries. Equally, the traditional theories of development, which lay important emphasis on 
international trade and exchange of capital, have come under severe criticism over the years.  
The first of these theories is the neo classical microeconomic theory. It was the dominant theory used to explain reasons 
for FDI inflows until the 1960s (Dunning 1993). According to this neo-classical microeconomic theory, the price of 
capital is determined by the interest rate (Aggarwal 1984) and capital movements are caused by the differences in 
interest rates that exist between countries. From the view of this neo-classical theory, capital is a commodity, thus its 
price determines its supply as well as its demand and allocation.  Capital will thus flow freely from countries with low 
rates of return to those with relatively high rates of return under conditions of perfect competition (Iverson 1953). The 
limitation of this theory according to its critics is its inability to explain the role of Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) 
in capital mobility because it limits itself to explaining how and where firms decide to obtain the capital needed to 
finance their global plans. Critics also hold the view that because the theory is silent about the purpose of its investment, 
i.e. either for managerial control or production capabilities, its role in modern times is suited only to the explanation of 
portfolio investments rather than FDI. 
Another theory of FDI is that of the intangible capital approach. According to this theory, the possession by a firm of 
specific ‘monopolistic advantages ‘or ‘intangible assets’ is a sine qua non for its overseas production (Lall 1980). These 
advantages may include production techniques, managerial skills, industrial organisation, and knowledge of the product 
as well as the factor markets. The theory outlines three useful purposes, which these advantages must serve. First, these 
advantages must provide a competitive edge to the firm concerned and they must outweigh those of foreign rivals as 
well as those in the prospective country in which it plans to invest. Second, the monopolistic advantage that the firm 
possesses must be transferable abroad and should be employed most economically at the foreign location. Thirdly, the 
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firm itself must profit from the exploitation of these advantages rather than licensing or selling them out to an 
independent firm. 
Rugman (1986) proposes another explanation based on internalization theory. This theory examines FDI from the point 
of view of a need to internalize transaction costs in order to improve profitability and to explain the emergence of FDI 
effectiveness (Banga, 2003). During the past decade, the world economy became increasingly integrated with a 
significant rise in FDI as a consequence (Busse, 2004). However, these theories were not capable to explain, to a certain 
extent, why the FDI investors choose to invest in a country rather than in another and, particularly, the marginalization 
of the African continent. Actually, several determinants were identified through the literature. One distinguishes mainly 
traditional determinants including economic factors and social determinants like the ones based on human capital. 
Recent studies emphasized the need to improve and support advantages in host countries by the incentive role their 
governments play. Following these studies, the debate on the choice of FDI establishment is now evolving around the 
quality of institutions as another important determinant. 
2.2 Empirical approach: Institutions and FDI 
Since the late 1990s, a growing interest has emerged in studying the links between institutions and FDI. Good 
institutions are supposed to exert a positive influence on development through the promotion of investment in general. 
FDI represent a considerable part of capital formation in developing countries (UNCTAD, 2004). According to Sachs 
(2003), the concept of institutions became the intermediate goal of any economic reforms. It emerges from recent 
studies (Rodrik, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2002; Sachs, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004) that 
economic development of a country is explained mainly by its institutions, resources, economic policies, geography and 
geopolitics. Several empirical studies reveal the importance of institutions through FDI behaviour models (Acemoglu et 
al., 2001 and 2003; Asiedu, 2003 and 2005; Banga, 2003; Busse, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004). Rodrik (1997) emphasized 
the fact that institutional quality explained the growth and FDI gaps between East Asian countries and African countries 
better than traditional economic factors (capital accumulation, technical progress, and rise in labour supply). Chan and 
Gemajel (2003) also emphasize that factors like political stability, institutional quality, a lack of internal and external 
conflicts, a low level of corruption, a lack of bureaucracy, trade liberalization and an attractive business environment 
draw foreign investors. Hall and Jones (1999), from a sample of 133 countries, reveal that institutions promoting 
production and private property stimulate human and physical capital accumulation and, consequently, increase the total 
factors productivity and the domestic product. Concerning the institutional quality in Africa, a study on 23 African 
countries suggests that institutions in Africa have not yet progressed sufficiently to contribute significantly to 
development (Nsouli, 2000). Other studies, such as that of Asiedu (2003) related to 22 SSA countries reveal that the 
effectiveness of institutions, the political and economic stability and the small level of corruption encourage private 
capital inflows. 
Several contributions have focused on the role of institutions in locating FDI, for example Wheeler and Mody (1992) 
find that a composite index of risk factors, which include bureaucratic red tape, political instability, corruption and 
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quality of the legal system, has no significant influence in determining the location of US foreign affiliates. However 
this composite index lumps together several institutional variables with other variables such as risk of terrorism, living 
environment of expatriates, inequality etc, which are not directly related to the quality of institutions. Wei (1997, 2000) 
uses data on bilateral FDI stocks from OECD countries and finds that corruption, as well as uncertainty regarding 
corruption, has a significant negative effect on FDI.  
Globerman and Shapiro (1999) argue that good institutions may have a positive impact on FDI flows because they 
create favourable conditions for multinational companies to emerge and invest abroad. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) 
estimate the impact of governance indicators developed by Kaufman et al. (1999a, b) on both inflows and outflows of 
FDI. They find that good governance impacts positively both on FDI inflows and outflows, although the latter effect is 
only significant for relatively big and developed countries. One major limitation of these studies is that the empirical 
results do not incorporate bilateral parameters where, for example, institutional quality variables in both the source 
country and the host country are not included simultaneously. Thus, it is not possible to rank the importance of 
governance in the source country compared to that of the host country. 
Recently, several studies have studied the impact of institutions on FDI inflows. While one strand of thought shows the 
relationship to be positive (Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Jensen, 2003; Busse, 2004), Li and Resnick (2003) argue that 
there is more to the relationship. Though democratic right has an indirect boosting impact on FDI inflows by improving 
property rights protection, the direct impact on FDI is negative. Busse and Hefeker (2005) show in their study that some 
aspects of political stability like government stability, the absence of internal and external conflicts, basic democratic 
rights and an efficient law and order system, matter significantly in determining FDI inflows. They show that foreign 
investors are susceptible to changes in political stability of an economy. 
Stein and Daude (2007) find inward FDI to be significantly influenced by the quality of institutional variables such as 
political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and graft. However, political 
representation and accountability indicators have an insignificant effect on inward FDI. The International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) and La Porta et al. (1998) variables such as risk of repudiation of contracts by government, and risk of 
the expropriation and shareholders rights are important variables when considering where to invest. 
 Kostevc et al. (2007) analysed the relation between foreign direct investment and the quality of the institutional 
environment in transition economies. The analysis confirmed a significant impact of various institutional aspects on the 
inflow of foreign capital. To isolate the importance of the institutional environment from the impact of other factors, a 
panel data analysis was performed using the data of 24 transition economies in the period 1995-2002. The results 
showed that in the observed period the quality of the institutional environment significantly influenced the level of 
foreign direct investment in transition economies. Other variables that proved to have a statistically significant influence 
were budget deficit, insider privatization, and labour cost per hour. 
Busse and Hefeker (2007) explore the linkages among political risk, institutions, and foreign direct investment inflows. 
For a data sample of 83 developing countries covering 1984 to 2003, we identify indicators that matter most for the 
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activities of multinational corporations. The results show that government stability, internal and external conflict, 
corruption and ethnic tensions, law and order, democratic accountability of government, and quality of bureaucracy are 
highly significant determinants of foreign investment inflows. Wei (2000) examines a bilateral panel of FDI data and 
provides evidence that corruption in a host country negatively affects inward FDI particularly from U.S. and EU. 
Similarly, Aizenman and Spiegel (2000) introduce an imperfect enforcement contract framework and show that 
corruption discourages FDI more severely than it discourages domestic investments. 
 Hausmann and Fernandez Arias (2000) use the Kaufmann et al. (1999a, b) data on institutional variables and indices of 
creditor and shareholder rights from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, and 1999) to study the effects on the composition of 
capital inflows. They find that foreign portfolio investment is more sensitive to the quality of institutions, that regulatory 
burden, and government effectiveness and shareholders rights have significant effects on FDI as a share of GDP.  
Mody et al. (2003) finds that the proportion of FDI in comparison to portfolio investment is lower in countries where 
institutions are more transparent. They present empirical evidence based on an index of creditor’s rights from La Porta 
et al. (1998) in their gravity model to explain the ratio of FDI flows to trade. 
 In a set of cross-country regressions, Aizenman and Spiegel (2004) find that the share of FDI to gross fixed investment 
as well as the ratio of FDI to private domestic investment is negatively and significantly correlated with the level of 
corruption and FDI is more sensitive than domestic investment to the level of institutional quality.  
Three general approaches are usually adopted by the recent empirical studies to measure institutional quality (Kaufmann 
et al., 2002; Rodrick et al., 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2003; Asiedu, 2003; Edison, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004; Alfaro et al., 
2005): (i) the quality of the public affairs management (corruption, political rights, effectiveness of the public sector and 
weight of regulations); (ii) the existence of property rights and their application; (iii) the constraints imposed to political 
leaders. However, these measures are not objective since they emanate from subjective evaluations and appreciations of 
national experts or from evaluations of the population collected by surveys carried out by international and 
nongovernmental organizations (Edison, 2003). Since institutional variables are also endogenous, Edison suggests being 
careful in empirical analyses especially about the causality direction. From an econometric point of view, the problem 
would be solved by including instrumental variables.  
Rodrick et al. (2002) estimate the respective contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income 
levels around the world, using instruments for institutions and trade. Their results indicate that the once institutions are 
controlled for, measures of geography have at best weak direct effects on incomes, although they have a strong indirect 
effect by influencing the quality of institutions. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, trade is almost always 
insignificant, and often enters the income equation with the wrong (i.e. negative) sign, although trade too has a positive 
effect on institutional quality. 
Borenzstein et al. (1992) tested the effect of FDI on economic growth using cross country regressions for 69 developing 
countries. De Gregorio (1992) found a significant impact of FDI on growth using a panel analysis of 12 Latin American 
countries while Blomstrom et al (1996) found the same using a panel of least developed nations. De Mello (1996) 
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employed both time series and cross section analysis to establish the complementarity between FDI and domestic 
investment. Calvo and Sanchez-Robles (2002) have delved into the interlinkages among FDI, economic freedom and 
economic growth. According to them, panel approach is an improvement over cross section analysis since the former 
takes into account the variability within countries and also “allow for differences in production function of the various 
nations in the form of unobservable individual effects”. 
Several recent studies have stressed the importance of quality of institutions for economic development (e.g., Acemoglu 
et al., 2001; Hall & Jones, 1999; Knack & Keefer, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Mauro, 1995). But in many researches on 
the resource curse hypothesis, the institutional channel has rarely been verified with much success, although it has 
frequently been mentioned as an important potential determinant of the curse. Quality of institutions is often simply 
controlled for by using a measure of corruption (e.g., Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2004; Sachs & Warner, 1995a).   
Mehlum et al. (2006) show that the interaction of natural resource abundance with high-quality institutions, --measured 
by an aggregate indicator,-- has a positive growth effect, while the direct negative growth effect of resource wealth 
seems to persist. However, these results are based on resource exports data, which pose the problems already discussed 
above: we contend that they more accurately depict the effects of natural resource exports dependence.  
From a more qualitative angle, historians, political scientists, and economists generally agree that the presence of 
abundant natural resources (especially minerals) leads to rent seeking behaviour and corruption, thereby decreasing the 
quality of government, which in turn negatively affects economic performance. Robinson et al. (2006) develop a 
political economy model which shows that the impact of a ‘‘resource boom’’ crucially depends on the quality of the 
political institutions, and in particular the degree of clientelism in the public sector. Countries with worse-quality 
institutions are more likely to suffer from a resource curse. There is also evidence that natural resource abundance 
considerably increases the potential of violent civil conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005). Empirically, rent-seeking due to 
natural resources has been shown to be nonlinear, both with respect to income and the total amount of resources in a 
country. In his cross-country study, Ross (2001) finds that the negative resource effects of mineral abundance on 
institutions decline with increasing income levels and with greater past mineral exports. And in their case study of 
Nigeria, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003, p.10) describe how ‘‘oil corrupts and excess oil corrupts more than 
excessively.’’ They stress that the natural resource curse only holds for mineral—and particularly oil—abundance, and 
not agricultural products and food (all measured by their respective export shares). 
In a different vein, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) show that natural resource abundance may have negative effects on 
development when weak institutions allow resource profits to be spent in government consumption rather than 
investment, especially in countries with low levels of real saving. Stijns (2005) contends that there are both positive and 
negative channels through which natural resource abundance affects economic growth: he finds that land abundance 
tends to have negative effects on all determinants of growth, including different measures of institutional quality, while 
the effects of mineral abundance are less clear-cut. 
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Finally, Acemoglu et al. (2001) test the effects on current income levels of their instrumented indicator for institutions 
against those of natural resource abundance, measured by the country shares of world no fuel mineral reserves and per 
capita oil resources. They find no significant influence of natural resource abundance at all, confirming their view that 
institutional quality alone can explain a great deal of the cross-country differences in economic development, and 
implicitly questioning the natural resource curse hypothesis even further. 
3-Model and data description 
This section specifies the model used in the empirical investigation of the relationship between institutions and FDI. It 
also provides a simple description of the data set used in the empirical investigation. 
3-1-Model Specification 
To empirically investigate the role played by institutions in determining FDI, the following simple model is used 
itit
VCitInstiit
FDI      (1) 
Where FDI, is measured as the net foreign direct investment inflow as a percentage of GDP to take into account the 
effect of the country size.  Inst is an indicator of institutional quality. It is constructed from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) which is provided by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. Since the beginnings of the 1980s, 
PRS Group has been providing information on 12 subcategories of political risk indicators that assess different aspects 
of institutional quality of 142 countries. The main advantage of these datasets is that they are available for a 
considerable time span, also allowing us to test the relevance of institutions in attracting FDI exploiting the time 
variation. This also enables us to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity that could bias our cross-section 
estimates. The variables we consider are a subset of the ones available from the ICRG database that refer to political 
risk. Specifically, we use the following indicators: Government Stability (stabgov), Profile Investment (profinv), 
Democratic Accountability (demo), Law and Order (rol), and Control of Corruption (corr). While the first two variables 
are assessed on a scale from 0 to 12, the last three are coded between 0 and 6; and Bureaucratic Quality (burqal) is 
assessed on a scale from 0 to 4. In order to facilitate comparability, as Kaufmann et al. (1999a), we standardize all 
variables in our sample to mean zero and standard deviation of one. In all cases, high score equates to very low risk and 
low score means very high risk. In other words, higher values indicate better institutions and secure property rights. 
Another type of variable is political risk represented by two indices: internal conflict (inconf) and external conflict 
(exconf). The data were obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The sign of the coefficient is not 
determined a priori. Each indicator is assessed on a scale from 0 to 12 with higher values indicating less political risk 
and better institutions. In general, we would expect that all indicators are positively related to FDI inflows, as less 
political risk and better institution may attract FDI due to a lower risk. 
CV is a vector of controlling variables drawn from the empirical literature of FDI determinants.  
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α i  is a common fixed-effect term and  itis the disturbance term. i denotes cross-section unit with i 1,2,........,N; N is 
the number of countries and t denotes time-periods with t 1, 2, ......., T ; T is number of time periods. 
Choosing the set of controlling variables is to some extent problematic, because the empirical literature suggests a large 
number of variables as potential determinants of FDI, and while some of these are proposed by various theories of FDI, 
others are included because they can be linked intuitively to FDI (Moosa and Cardak, 2006). However, in this paper we 
use the following one. The degree of openness (do), the ratio of merchandised trade to GDP, which is used to capture 
the influence of trade openness on FDI with a positive sign being expected. The Market Size (gdp) and the Growth rate 
(growth) which are used to capture the influence of market size of the host country. FDI literature documents that a 
market size measure is expected to have a positive impact on FDI, as a large market means a greater demand for goods 
and services which attracts market-seeking FDI. The inflation rate (Infl), which is measured by the annual percentage 
change in the consumer price index. Inflation rate is used as a proxy for macroeconomic stability. Macroeconomic 
stability reduces the level of uncertainty encountered by investors and increases the level of confidence in the economy, 
which encourages FDI. The Real Exchange Rate (exchrat) could prove to be an important factor in the FDI fluctuations 
on the world market. It is a measure of international competitiveness. However, its impact is rather ambiguous, as the 
literature (both theoretical and empirical) on the issue suggests. In addition to these variables, the set of controlling 
variables will include other variables namely, natural resources (natres). The omission of a measure of natural 
resources from the estimation, especially for African counties case, may cause the estimates to be biased (Asiedu, 
2002). As some of studies, we use the share of minerals and oil in total exports to capture the availability of natural 
resource endowments.  
Thus, the model that will be used as a benchmark to assess the role played by institutions in determining FDI, takes the 
following form: 
ititexchratit
l
it
natres
it
doitgrowthitgdpitInstiit
FDI




7
inf
65
4321
              (2) 
To explain the observed non-linearity between quality of institution and FDI inflows, we introduced natural resources 
factor in our analysis. This helps us explore whether the levels of quality of institutions play a role in the ability of a 
country to use natural resource to its advantage and reap its benefits by attracting more FDI. For this we alter our 
regression specification (equation2) as 
  ititnatresInstitexchratitl
it
natres
it
doitgrowthitgdpitInstiit
FDI




*
87
inf
6
54321
 (3) 
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3-2 Data description 
 
The empirical analysis is based on 30 SSA countries and covers the period from 1984 to 2007. A list of the countries 
included in the sample, and data sources for all variables used in the analysis, are presented in Appendix. The choice of 
countries and the time period is determined by the availability of the data. All data were sampled at 5-year intervals for 
25 years from 1984 to 2007, that is, 1984-1988, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003 and 2004-2007. Transforming data 
from annual observations to five-year averages has several advantages. First, it may help to limit the impact of business 
cycles on the estimated coefficient, as FDI net inflows vary widely from year to year, resulting in large fluctuations that 
may obscure the impact of persistent variables like institutions on FDI. Second, averaging the data over five-year 
intervals reduces the number of observations with zero or negative values, which would otherwise be need different 
specification from the regression analysis.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables included in the model. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for all 
the explanatory variables and the log of FDI, the dependent variable and gives a first but crude approximation of the 
relationship between FDI and its determinants. Table 2 shows that FDI is positively correlated with indicators of market 
size, log of GDP per capita and GDP growth rate, the ratio of trade to GDP, and institutional quality. Table 2 shows that 
the relationship between FDI and its determinants, except inflation rate, is significant at 1% level. The relationship 
between FDI and indicators of openness to trade and indicators of institutional quality is particularly strong. On the 
other hand, the correlation between FDI and inflation rate is not that strong as shown by the size of the correlation 
coefficient. In addition, most of the indicators for political risk and institutions quality are fairly strongly related to gdp, 
indicating that richer countries possess less political risk and have better institutions. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI 150 2.023 3.949 -8.757 46.488 
GDP 150 8.367 1.274 4.870 12.560 
DO 150 70.594 32.627 11 296 
CORR 150 2.435 1.101 0 6 
ROL 150 2.682 1.087 0 5 
DEMO 150 2.713 1.248 0 5.500 
BURQAL 150 1.333 0.940 0 4 
EXCHRAT 150 118.364 55.934 29 772 
INFL 150 85.746 1039.601 -29 26762 
NATRES 150 0.333 0.472 0 1 
INCONF 150 7.247 2.559 0 12 
EXCONF 150 8.633 2.326 2 12 
PROFINV 150 5.834 2.187 0 11.5 
STABGOV 150 7.038 2.454 0.667 11.583 
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Table2: Correlation matrix of the variables included in model          
 FDI 
Market 
size growth Exchrat natres Open Infl Rol Corr Stabgov Profinv Inconf Exconf Demo Burqal 
FDI 1.000               
Market size 0.174b 1.000              
growth 0.483a 0.101 1.000             
Exchrat 0.656a 0.149c 0.401a 1.000            
natres 0.722a 0.180b 0.329a 0.658a 1.000           
Open 0.775a 0.092 0.447a 0.731a 0.680a 1.000          
Infl 0.093 -0.009 (-0.136)c 0.021 0.152c 0.055 1.000         
Rol 0.779a 0.131 0.511a 0.810a 0.623a 0.833a 0.032 1.0000        
Corr 0.677a 0.206b 0.437a 0.808a 0.589a 0.775a 0.001 0.8810a 1.000       
Stabgov 0. 800a 0.195b 0.534a 0.791a 0.712a 0.846a 0.060 0.9057a 0.825a 1.000      
Profinv 0.780a 0.241a 0.531a 0.804a 0.687a 0.820a 0.029 0.9152a 0.851a 0.948a 1.000     
Inconf 0.786a 0.172b 0.502a 0.822a 0.693a 0.843a 0.051 0.9359a 0.858a 0.945a 0.955a 1.000    
Exconf 0.778a 0.197b 0.470a 0.834a 0.737a 0.846a 0.093 0.9226a 0.862a 0.948a 0.945a 0.970a 1.000   
Demo 0.750a 0.271a 0.493a 0.786a 0.661a 0.777a 0.055 0.9024a 0.871a 0.901a 0.934a 0.931a 0.923a 1.000  
Burqal 0.664a 0.277a 0.362a 0.778a 0.643a 0.758a 0.061 0.8344a 0.861a 0.817a 0.848a 0.849a 0.849a 0.859a 1.000 
                                
 
a;b;c denotes significance levels at 1%, 5.0% and 10%, respectively. 
 
A central issue before making the appropriate specification, often ignored by past researchers, is to test if the variables are 
stationary or not. Since the papers by Levin & Lin (1992, 1993), this test has become popular. We thus carry out panel unit 
root tests on the dependent and independent variables. We follow the approach of Levin & Lin (LL test) and Im, Pesaran, and 
Shin (IPS test) who developed a panel unit root test for the joint null hypothesis that every time series in the panel is non 
stationary. This approach is based on the average of individual series ADF test and has a standard normal distribution once 
adjusted in a particular manner. The results of these tests suggest that in every case we reject a unit root in favour of stationary 
at the 5 percent significance level. 
 
Table 3: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests  
 
Variables FDI BURQAL ROL DEMO CORR DO INV CHAS GOV NATRES 
LL Test -2.89 
(0.001) 
-1.84 
(0.033) 
-2.802 
(0.000) 
-1.69 
(0.041) 
-8.31 
(0.000) 
-1.66 
(0.040) 
-11. 85 
(0.000) 
-8.69 
(0.000) 
-10.78 
(0.000) 
-8.0569 
(0.000) 
IPS Test -2.035 
(0.02) 
 
-9.77 
(0.000) 
-1.85 
(0.030) 
-1.35 
(0.089) 
-9.54 
(0.000) 
-1.96 
(0.020) 
-1.34 
(0.09) 
-9.62 
(0.000) 
-13.84 
(0.000) 
-6.370 
(0.0000) 
 
Variables EXCHRAT INFR GDP DEBT INFL EXCONF INCONF STABGOV PROFINV TXGDP 
LL Test -2.69 
(0.003) 
-3.492 
(0.000) 
-6.10 
(0.000) 
-2.56 
(0.005) 
-5.86 
(0.000) 
-3.19 
(0.000) 
-2.26 
(0.011) 
-1.87 
(0.032) 
-2.21 
(0.012) 
-5.35 
(0.000) 
IPS Test -2.78 
(0.003) 
 
-3.15 
(0.000) 
-11.02 
(0.050) 
-3.23 
(0.000) 
-6.78 
(0.000) 
-3.50 
(0.047) 
-1.98 
(0.020) 
-0.38 
(0.031) 
-1.34 
(0.090) 
-8.05 
(0.000) 
Note: P-values are in parentheses  
 
4-Empirical results 
 
To empirically assess the role played by institutions in determining FDI inflows, Models 2 and 3 are based on a random 
effect specification of the basic model. This specification is supported by a Hausman test, reported in table 4.1. The 
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empirical investigation will first cover the impact of institutions on FDI for all samples, and then the role of institutions 
at countries characteristics (resource intensive countries and non resource intensive countries) will be considered. 
 
4-1-The results from Total Sample 
 
The results are based on a random-effects model, since the Hausman (1978) test suggests using a random-effects model 
instead of a fixed-effects model in most of cases. The key estimates in Tables are the coefficients on institutions and 
natural resources. 
Column 1 of Table 4.1 reports the results of the benchmark Model without the institutions variable, Inst. All control 
variables have the expected sign. The results shows that FDI were attracted to countries with abundance natural 
resources, with growing markets, as the coefficient on GDP growth rate is positive and significant. This may indicate 
that market-related variables are important for FDI. However, the other market size indicator, the log of GDP per capita, 
appears insignificant; indicating that market size is not an important factor in explaining the variations of FDI within the 
considered sample. The results in column 1 also show that trade openness, as measured by trade-GDP ratio, and natural 
resources have a positive and significant impact on FDI, and those countries with higher trade-GDP ratio or resource 
intensive countries attracted, ceteris paribus, more FDI.  Furthermore, exchange rate and macroeconomic stability, as 
measured by the percentage change on consumer price index, are insignificantly related to FDI. 
We then add the indicators for political risk and institutions one by one to the model to see whether they explain any 
variation to the control variables. The results are in column 2 to 8 of the Table 4.1. Our findings indicate that all 
indicators, except control corruption and quality of bureaucracy, are significant and positively correlated with FDI 
flows. These results indicate that institutions play significant roles in determining FDI inflows. This means that FDI is 
attracted to countries with high quality institutions that protect property rights. The results for government stability and 
democratic accountability of the government show that foreign investors are highly sensitive to changes in political 
stability and the framework in which governments operate. Fundamental democratic rights, like civil liberties and 
political rights do matter to multinationals operating in SSA countries, even when we control for other factors that affect 
FDI flows. These results are in line with the findings by Busse and Hefeker (2007), Busse (2004) and Jensen (2003), 
which all showed that basic democratic rights are positively correlated with FDI inflows, even if the specifications of 
their models differ. 
Moreover, the relative importance of investment profile is hardly surprising, given that profinv contains key 
subcomponents, such as contract viability, expropriation of assets or the ability of multinationals to repatriate profits. 
Clearly, these subcomponents are exceptionally important for multinationals decisions on where to invest. In the same 
way, foreign investors seem to care about internal and external conflicts that affect the host country of their investment, 
as it increases economic and political instability. The threat of incidence of these conflicts, such as civil war, trade 
sanctions, cross-boarder conflicts or an all-out war, creates higher uncertainty. Thus, investors increase the risk 
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premium of investment projects, which in turn reduces overall investment. In addition, such conflicts have a strong 
negative impact on a country’s growth rate, thus making investment generally less attractive. 
Table 4.1: Effects of select variables on Foreign Direct Investment in sub-Saharan Africa: 
Panel Data Estimations using random effects, 1984-2007 (5-year averages): All countries    
                    
 Model0 Rol Corr Stabgov Profinv Inconf Exconf Demo Burqal 
                    
Size of market 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Exchange rate -0.0066 -0.0404b -0.0031 -0.0116 -0.0193 -0.0319 -0.0213 -0.0206 -0.0145 
Growth rate 0.7148c 0.4444 0.7124c 0.3049 0.4709 0.3782 0.6148c 0.5469 0.7375b 
Openness to 
trade 0.2380a 0.1209a 0.2450a 0.1090b 0.1644a 0.1294a 0.1624a 0.1857a 0.2186a 
Inflation 0.0011 0.0006 0.0011 0.0016 0.0018 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006 0.0010 
Natural 
resources 0.2658a 0.2224a 0.2672a 0.1301c 0.1974a 0.1876a 0.2021a 0.2320a 0.2585a 
Institutional  0.4672a -0.3892 2.3717a 1.7734a 1.7393a 1.1497b 2.4669b 1.4260 
Constant -9.1613a -6.9812b -9.1362a -10.2854a -9.5509a -7.3058b -9.4635 -8.5979a -8.5405 
                    
          
R2 0.6884 0.7257 0.6860 0.7081 0.7115 0.7111 0.7016 0.7071 0.6894 
Wald test 524.9200 632.4900 523.3300 666.1600 567.3200 596.0200 553.9800 549.5400 529.0800 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
No 
observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
          
Hausman test 4.1400 0.8700 5.9800 4.0500 0.9000 3.0800 2.1200 1.8900 3.1700 
Prob>Chi2 0.6574 0.9900 0.4252 0.7736 0.9833 0.8774 0.9528 0.9299 0.7872 
                    
a; b; c denote significance levels at 1%, 5.0% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Several aspects of the results from different variants of Model can be highlighted: First, it seems that institutions have a 
positive and significant impact on FDI and that this impact is not sensitive to controlling variables changes. Second, as 
far as the country sample and time period covered are concerned, it seems that FDI is driven mainly by the liberty of the 
trade regime, natural resources and institutional quality, and to a lesser extent, by growth of market size, while market 
size indicators, exchange rate, and macroeconomic stability did not play a significant role in determining FDI inflows. 
Given these results, it might be interesting, especially for policymakers, to explore the relative importance of institutions 
in attracting FDI inflows compared with other variables, particularly with policy related variables like inflation rate. 
This is particularly important as empirical literature provides little guidance on the relative contribution of institutional 
quality in attracting FDI.  
In the first regression in Table 4.1., the interaction effect between institutions and natural resources is not included. 
Adding the interaction between institutions and natural resources, (from second regression table 4.2) gives a significant 
result for this term, while other results remain qualitatively unchanged. In other words, rejecting the influence of 
institutions and natural resources on FDI flows in SSA based on the first regression would be premature. In fact, what 
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the significance of the interaction effect tells us is that the effect of natural resources on FDI depends on the institutions 
of the host country. In fact, the analysis of the interaction between the indicators of institutions quality and natural 
resources shows that impact of external conflict, democratic accountability and quality of bureaucracy on FDI flows 
depends on abundance of natural resources in host countries. On the other hand, when controlling for corruption, our 
result indicates that the impact of natural resources on FDI flows depends on the quality of institutions in host countries. 
Moreover, interaction between natural resources and internal conflict, rule and law and government stability reveals no 
impact on the FDI flows in host countries. These findings suggest some important implications: For countries with 
bad institutions quality natural resources attract inflows of FDI. For countries with good institutions quality FDI inflows 
is discouraged by natural resources. And the worse the institutions in the host country, the more is FDI attracted by 
natural resources. Conversely, the effect of institutions also depends on the natural resources. The more abundant the 
natural resources, the more FDI is attracted by poor institutions. In sum, FDI is attracted to countries which combine 
large natural resources and poor institutions.  
Table 4.2: Panel Data Interactions Estimations, 1984-2007 (5-year averages): All countries   
                    
  Rol Corr Stabgov Profinv Inconf Exconf Demo Burqal 
                    
          
Size of market  0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Exchange rate  -0.0345c -0.0524b -0.0267 -0.0457c -0.0453c -0.0595b -0.0546b -0.0547b 
Growth  rate  0.4571 0.8348b 0.3633 0.5935 0.4513 0.7143b 0.6871c 0.7762b 
Openness to trade  0.1156b 0.1276b 0.1865a 0.1217b 0.1083b 0.1112b 0.1242b 0.1314b 
Inflation  0.0006 0.0007 0.0014 0.0013 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 
Natural  resources  0.2150a 0.1137 0.2079a 0.1568b 0.1646b 0.1475b 0.1651b 0.1731b 
Institutional  4.4604a -3.8198a 2.0566a 0.9861a 1.3777b 0.1544 -0.7733 -1.1090 
Interactions*  0.0011 0.0255a 0.0019 -0.0073a 0.0018 0.0046b 0.0115b 0.0228a 
Constant  -5.5574 16.2931b -4.5681 1.2726 -1.4909 7.3976 5.0442 7.4475 
                    
          
R2  0.7252 0.6907 0.7081 0.7092 0.7098 0.7036 0.7074 0.6994 
Wald test  631.1500 605.9600 668.9100 577.9300 598.6700 577.9200 571.5900 564.1700 
Prob>Chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No countries  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
No observations  150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
                    
a;b;c denotes significance levels at 1%, 5.0% and 10%, respectively. * Interaction between natural resources and institutional quality. 
 
4-2-The results based on host countries characteristics 
 
The motives of FDI vary greatly across the countries in which firms operate. For example, for resource intensive 
countries, the primary reason for foreign investors to choose the location is abundance of natural resources. Despite the 
obvious importance of studies of FDI determinants at the more disaggregate level, the evidence on endowment 
differences is rather scarce in the existing literature. To analyze the relative impact of endowment differences, we divide 
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the sample into three groups, resource intensive countries (including oil exporting countries), non-resource intensive 
countries and oil exporting countries. 
The studies surveyed above use total sample data to explore the role played by institutions in determining the variations 
of FDI inflows. However, some papers argue that the impact of institutions on FDI may differ across countries 
characteristics. As Asiedu (2002), our results show that institutional indicators like control of corruption, government 
stability, internal, external conflicts, democracy and quality of bureaucracy are insignificantly related to FDI. These 
results should not be surprising, since a country like Angola and Nigeria which ranked first in attracting FDI in Sub 
Saharan Africa, are also highly instable countries. The reason for this is that FDI to Angola and Nigeria are driven 
mostly by the availability of fuel resources, and that the returns on these investments are high enough to cover the risk 
of political instability. We conclude that most of indicators of political risk are less relevant for resource intensive 
countries, particularly in the oil exporting countries.  
The coefficient of corruption has to be interpreted more carefully. Corruption is indexed such that the higher value 
refers to cleaner administration. Accordingly, a negative sign indicates that less corruption has positive impact on the 
economic growth. Both equation 2 and equation 3 indicate that less corruption in the host country would increase FDI. 
Although economic theory is ambiguous on the ultimate effects of corruption on FDI, it does propose several different 
mechanisms that can discourage FDI, including corrupt institutions acting as a tax on investment and heightened 
insecurity and uncertainty (see, for instance, Hakkala, Norback and Svaleryd 2005 and Wei 2000). 
Our paper provides evidence comparing the effects of institutions on FDI with the effects of non-policy variables like 
the availability of natural resources. In general case, our result concludes that countries that are small or lack natural 
resources can attract FDI by improving their institutions. More importantly, given the growing interest of many 
countries in attracting FDI inflows, policymakers may be interested more in knowing the relative importance of 
institutions compared with other policy tools they have rather than non-policy variables. This can help them to build 
their priorities for attracting FDI. 
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Table 5.1: Panel Data Estimations, 1984-2007 (5-year averages): Resource intensive countries   
                    
 Model0 Rol Corr Stabgov Profinv Inconf Exconf Demo Burqal 
                    
          
Size of market -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004b 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
Exchange rate -0.0519 -0.0112 -0.0474 -0.0164 -0.0513 -0.0487 -0.0553 -0.0515 -0.0437 
Growth  rate 1.3611 0.2993a 1.4055a 1.3706b 1.3091b 1.0086a 1.4033b 1.0385 1.4878c 
Openness to trade 0.2492c 0.3656b 0.3343a 0.4219b 0.4324b 0.3719a 0.4811b 0.4295b 0.4300b 
Inflation 0.0119 -0.0219a -0.0124a -0.0334a -0.0329b -0.0316a -0.0238b -0.0224b -0.0331a 
Natural resources 0.3761a 0.3389b 0.3635b 0.2371b 0.2592b 0.2349a 0.2222a 0.1329c 0.2470b 
Institutional  1.4740a -1.2910 2.6324 0.8754a 2.6192 -1.3670 5.3475 -3.6319 
Constant 7.2954 -46.7312c 11.4004 -4.7778 4.4742 -2.8394 14.2222 -9.1562 14.0153 
                    
          
R2 0.2061 0.4016 0.2337 0.3230 0.3095 0.2582 0.2976 0.2500 0.3974 
Wald test 10.9900 23.9100 10.9300 14.8700 19.9400 12.9900 19.4600 13.2000 12.2900 
Prob>Chi2 0.0888 0.0012 0.0518 0.0317 0.0017 0.0393 0.0019 0.0373 0.0413 
No countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
No observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
          
Hausman test 4.1400 1.0500 1.1400 0.4800 0.3800 1.4600 0.1800 0.7000 13.9000 
Prob>Chi2 0.6574 0.9835 0.9799 0.9995 0.9990 0.9622 0.9999 0.9944 0.0308 
                    
a;b;c denotes significance levels at 1%, 5.0% and 10%, respectively.  
 
Table 5.2: Panel Data Estimations, 1984-2007 (5-year averages): Non-resource intensive countries  
                    
 Model0 Rol Corr Stabgov Profinv Inconf Exconf Demo Burqal 
                    
Size of market 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Exchange rate -0.0262 -0.0384b -0.0122 -0.0133 -0.0216 -0.0340c -0.0268 -0.0277 -0.0316 
Growth rate 0.129 -0.1236 0.2196 -0.2784 -0.2841 -0.2921 -0.0362 -0.0694 0.1493 
Openness to trade 0.2266a 0.1627a 0.2516a 0.1486a 0.1644a 0.1490a 0.1391a 0.1914a 0.2082a 
Inflation -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0019 
Natural resources 0.3646a 0.2383a 0.3727a 0.1506c 0.1924b 0.1904b 0.1933b 0.3145a 0.3485a 
Institutional  3.6772a -1.6323c 1.9840a 2.0973a 1.7110a 1.5638a 1.7474b 1.3812 
Constant -5.508 -7.0037c -5.2672 -11.1452a -9.6264a -7.5522b -9.8007b -6.3092 -5.2433 
                    
R2 0.8028 0.8441 0.7968 0.8393 0.8460 0.8482 0.8305 0.8160 0.8059 
Wald test 1195.6400 1463.7800 1229.6500 1613.4200 1422.3900 1425.6800 1432.7100 1223.4300 1205.6900 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
No observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
          
Hausman test 1.7300 1.1000 2.6900 0.5400 1.4500 3.4400 1.3300 2.4100 1.6800 
Prob>Chi2 0.9425 0.9816 0.8465 0.9993 0.9841 0.8416 0.9875 0.8780 0.9466 
                    
a;b;c denotes significance levels at 1%, 5.0% and 10%, respectively. * Interaction between natural resources and institutional quality. 
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The results of this paper show that institutions and natural resources have an interactive effect on foreign direct 
investment. The worse the institutional environment of a host country, the more is FDI attracted by the country's natural 
resources. These results add significantly to our understanding of FDI, since previous studies have not included these 
types of interaction effects, and therefore fail to capture an important relation between resource riches and institutions. 
In fact, what the significance of the interaction effect tells us is that the effect of natural resources on FDI depends on 
the institutions of the host country. For countries with bad institutions, natural resources attract foreign investment. For 
countries with good institutions foreign investment is discouraged by natural resources. And the worse institutions in the 
host country, the more is foreign investment attracted by natural resources. Conversely, the effect of institutions also 
depends on the natural resources. The more natural resources, the more is FDI attracted by poor institutions. In sum, 
FDI is attracted to countries which combine large natural resources and poor institutions.                                                                                                                                    
From the perspective of policymakers in SSA countries, what are the chief implications of our findings? In a nutshell, 
poor nations can increase their FDI inflows by taking steps to (a) improve institutional quality (increase the level of Law 
and order and democracy, curb the level of corruption and external conflict etc...); (b) improve the level of openness of 
trade and exchange rate policy; and then (c) strongly encourage growth. However, rich nations can increase their FDI 
inflows by winning steps to (a) get better macroeconomic stability policy and find a way to manage natural resources; 
(b) promote foreign trade; and then (c) improve economic growth.  
Table 6.1: Panel Data Interactions Estimations, 1984-2007 (5-year averages): Resource intensive countries  
                    
  Rol Corr Stabgov Profinv Inconf Exconf Demo Burqal 
                    
          
Size of market -0.0001 0.0018a 0.0011a 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 
Exchange rate  -0.0311 -0.0433 -0.0053 -0.0470 -0.0423 -0.0743 -0.0478 -0.0505 
Growth  rate  0.8266b 0.9570b 0.8964b 1.7141c 1.6658c 0.9454b 1.6455c 1.0491 
Openness to trade  0.4616a 0.4831a 0.4057b 0.4262a 0.3944b 0.4732b 0.4548a 0.4413a 
Inflation  
-
0.0243b -0.0244b -0.0225b -0.0199c -0.0213b -0.0370a -0.0226b -0.0246b 
Natural resources  0.7879b 0.9368a 0.4004a 0.5926b 0.4526b 0.2420a 0.4020b 0.6056a 
Institutional  2.3240a 1.5258c 1.0592 0.9465b 2.1751 -4.5978 0.8760 0.7703 
Interactions* -0.1378 -0.3005b -0.0739 -0.0688 -0.0348 0.0729 -0.0786 -0.2859a 
Constant  
-
73.5005 -35.1576 24.5327 -15.4105 -9.4058 46.1511 -12.7010 -4.7676 
                    
          
R2  0.4371 0.3449 0.4061 0.3131 0.2922 0.2607 0.2885 0.4167 
Wald test  27.4600 18.6200 20.4300 13.0600 12.5300 13.7000 14.3700 21.3000 
Prob>Chi2  0.0006 0.0070 0.0058 0.0599 0.0691 0.0590 0.0426 0.0044 
No countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
No observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
                    
a;b;c denotes significance levels at 1%, 5.0% and 10%, respectively. * Interaction between natural resources and institutional quality. 
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Table 6.2: Panel Data Interactions Estimations, 1984-2007 (5-year averages): Non-resource intensive countries 
                    
  Rol Corr Stabgov Profinv Inconf Exconf Demo Burqal 
                    
          
Size of market 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Exchange rat e  -0.0735a -0.0776a -0.0520b -0.0629b -0.0669a -0.0713a -0.0854a -0.0928a 
Growth  rate  -0.061 0.3032 -0.2048 -0.1543 -0.1884 -0.0168 0.0564 0.0433 
Openness to trade  0.1081a 0.1177a 0.0999b 0.1133a 0.1050b 0.0922b 0.1074b 0.1059b 
Inflation  -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0001 
Natural resources  0.1229 -0.0104 0.0548 0.0932 0.0942 0.0806 0.0986 0.0965 
Institutional  1.9833c -5.0025a 1.3497a 1.0906c 1.0436b 0.7048 -0.2807 -2.5276c 
Interactions* 0.0119b 0.0364a 0.0047b 0.0063b 0.0041b 0.0049a 0.0195a 0.0379a 
Constant  6.1128 23.9452a 1.4917 4.5032 4.3858 6.4795 13.1542b 16.6601a 
                    
          
R2  0.8435 0.8154 0.8408 0.8432 0.8460 0.8339 0.8260 0.8232 
Wald test  1578.4700 2152.5800 1727.2400 1522.0300 1515.0800 1570.0700 1487.2500 1545.4300 
Prob>Chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
No observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
                    
a;b;c denotes significance levels at 1%, 5.0% and 10%, respectively. * Interaction between natural resources and institutional quality. 
 
 
5- Conclusion 
 
Foreign direct investments are the most desirable form of capital inflows to emerging and developing countries because 
they are less susceptible to crises and sudden stops. The goal of this paper was to explore in detail the role of quality 
institutions in host countries as determinants of foreign direct investment and whether the role of quality of institutions 
varies according to certain characteristics of countries (resource intensive countries and non-resource intensive 
countries). As we have pointed out, our main contribution is not to find new and provocative policy recommendation 
but to distinguish several alternative hypotheses about the relative influence of such factors as natural resources 
availability and  quality of institutions more broadly in those countries. This paper has also attempted to make a 
contribution to the empirical literature on the relationship between FDI and the institutional quality using a panel data 
model covering 30 SSA countries over the period 1984 to 2007.  
These results showed that institutional quality in host countries is one of the most important determinants of FDI 
inflows. In particular, institutional quality in host countries appeared more important for foreign investors than many 
other characteristics of host countries, such as market size, growing of market size, openness, etc. Another important 
finding in this paper is that the rule and law (security of property rights) appeared to be the most important institutions 
attribute for foreign investors, i.e. property rights protection is more important than democracy, corruption, political 
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stability, and investment profile. However, the results of regression also showed that the importance of institutions 
varies across countries potentiality whether country is resource intensive countries or non resource intensive countries. 
In particular, it appeared that institutions do play a significant role in attracting investments in non resource intensive 
countries. Moreover, the results showed that there is tentative evidence that FDI in resource intensive countries are less 
sensitive to institutions than in poor natural resources countries. 
These findings suggest some important implications: first, they enhance our understanding of the contribution of FDI to 
economic growth, and show that the impact of FDI on growth is not limited to its role in improving technology, but 
rather goes further, and includes a positive influence on institutional quality. Second, these findings indicate that the 
favourable development effects of FDI are in actuality greater than what is usually thought, and therefore these 
additional benefits must be taken into account when evaluating the merits of the programs aiming to attract FDI. 
Considering the interactions impact, our results show that the worse the institutions in the host country, the more foreign 
investment is attracted by natural resources. Conversely, the effect of institutions also depends on the natural resources. 
In sum, FDI is attracted to countries which combine large natural resources and poor institutions. 
For future work, we will explore the role of other institutional determinants developed by La Porta et al. (1999) and 
compare the impacts of both types of indicators on FDI. The question of threshold could be analyzed by looking for 
different levels of institutional quality that could affect the behaviour of foreign investors. Furthermore, additional work 
could take into account possible structural breaks for both variables (institutional quality and foreign direct investment). 
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